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Introduction
The Harvard School of Public Health has released an extremely important study on the
coronavirus pandemic in the U.S.1 I will refer to this study as “HS” in the rest of this paper. It is
the result of simulating, at a county-by-county level, the beds we will need to treat all the
patients who are hospitalized. The headline: In six months, 99 million people will be
infected and 21 million people will need 1.3 million beds. This is the fundamental
challenge we face. As the infection spreads and people get sick, we risk overwhelming our
healthcare system, threatening patients and healthcare workers alike. Of course, while beds are
necessary they are not sufficient. We need more healthcare workers and more ventilators. But
without beds we are nowhere.
This is, after all, why we are practicing social distancing. We want to slow the down the
infection’s spread, to “flatten the curve” in the current parlance. But as everyone acknowledges,
if social distancing—with its associated lockdowns—succeeds, we risk bankrupting many small
businesses that are the backbone of our economy and employ 34% of the workforce. Our living
standards will be compromised. Failure follows success.
In the following working paper, I want to make a plea for what I am calling a “reverse
quarantine”—quarantining people who are over 65 (who number 52 million), before they get
sick. We need to complement this policy with federally funded and locally organized efforts to
support seniors in place, drawing on the wellsprings of American pragmatism, the capacity to
respond in emergencies, American volunteerism, and neighbor-to-neighbor assistance. We can’t
turn quarantine into imprisonment. We must work as hard as we can to create a psychological
sense of community at a moment when, paradoxically, social distancing is driving us apart. This
may be utopian, but in the presence of disaster, hope can be motivating.
Why do this? If the elderly stay in place this will both reduce deaths, as seniors are the most
vulnerable, and reduce the number of people who can transmit the infection. We reduce the
total burden on the health system. With the burden eased, we can let the virus spread more
quickly, knowing that we have the hospital beds and equipment to help them. This would
shorten the economic downturn leading to fewer business bankruptcies. After all, within the
year, everyone who can be infected will be. The challenge that bedevils and threatens us,
should we find no resolution, is to match pacing with the requisite supply of beds. In this note I
provide the data and its analysis to back up this argument, to the best of my ability. I hope the
latter was up to the task.
This note is organized into six sections. In the first section, I introduce the HS and reproduce
within the limits of my Excel modeling tools, their projection. In the second, I argue that social
distancing will in all likelihood fail. We will have few of its benefits and most of its costs. In the
third, I draw on a long theoretical tradition that connects long bouts of unemployment to
deaths. I suggest that if social distancing provokes a long economic downturn, between 28,000
and 68,000 people will die in the years following the crisis. In the fourth, I briefly describe the
Chinese and South Korean strategies for coping with the crisis. I argue that their successes are
based on their distinctive culture and politics. We can’t use them here. In the fifth, I use a
range of data sources, starting with HS, to estimate how many beds are “released” by
quarantining seniors. I estimate that we can reduce the number of new beds we must build or
re-purpose by over a million if we quarantine the elderly, decrease the length of stay in non-ICU
1

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xAyBFTrlxSsTKQS7IDyr_Ah4JLBYj6_HX6ijKdm4fAY/edit#gid=0
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beds, and repurpose current hospital beds. This may be an overestimate—a best case
scenario—but I believe that the estimate is within an order of magnitude correct. In the sixth, I
outline the rudiments of an American plan for tackling the crisis acknowledging that it may be
still-born, with so little time left. It combines a war-economy with local initiative. I end with a
plea that we expand the discourse about the crisis beyond the language and frameworks of the
public health discipline. We need the voices of engineers, business leaders, economists and
project managers. If we ever needed a “systems view,” it is now.

I. The Harvard study
The bottom line of the Harvard report is as follows. In 120 days, 99 million people will have
been infected with the virus and 21 million will need to be hospitalized. These numbers are
based on their “mid-range” scenario in which 40% of the population is infected. I have not seen
the whole report, just the data released to help with city and county planning. I assume that
some version of what is called the “logistic growth curve” underlies it. It is the basic conceptual
tool for modeling the spread of infections. Logistic growth, as the following diagram shows,
consists of two phases, the first, the exponential phase, is one of rapid acceleration, the second
is a phrase of deceleration or gradual flattening.
Figure 1

Why does the curve flatten? This happens because a process of exponential growth comes up
against an absolute limit (for example, the number of people in a population who can possibly
be infected). In addition, as infected people become immune, the number of people who can be
infected declines, reducing the hosts the virus can attack. It stands to reason that as fewer
uninfected people remain, the growth curve will flatten.

©CFAR 2020

3

My very rough approximation
I don’t have access to the quality of simulation tools the HS analysts used to predict with
precision the bed shortage on a county-by-county basis in the U.S. But I used an Excel model to
create a rough approximation of the Harvard projection of infections.
The CDC reports—as of this writing, it changes daily—that there are about 4,000 people who
have been infected. To approximate the HS results, I created a logistic curve whose exponential
growth is about 20% every 1.5 days. The constraint that flattens the curve, is 40% of the U.S.
population. I also assumed that after 14 days a previously infected person can no longer be a
host, thus reducing the curve of acceleration by reducing the size of the “infectible” population.
The result is a curve as show in Figure 1 above. I scaled it so that 1/10,000 is the same as 1.
This simple simulation “produces” 75 million infections in 95 days. I don’t the know the HS
underlying parameters and formulas, but I will take my simple model as a rough approximation
of it.
Figure 2: Growth in number of Infected People
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Logistic growth and social distancing
The current response to the looming crisis is to promote isolation and social distance. This
seems sensible. After all, the less contact, the less infection. But the challenge is two-fold. First,
when the population of potential hosts is very large, as is the case in the U.S., it takes a long
time before the limits to growth kick in. Before that happens growth is exponential. Second, we
should not confuse social distance at the micro level with social distance at the aggregate level.
Consider why the Chinese succeeded. By locking down entire cities and restricting movements
to the fullest between them, they created sealed off zones with much smaller populations.
Under these conditions the virus infected a substantial proportion of the people in the sealed off
zone in a limited amount of time and once the infection reached its limit—all the people who
could be infected were—the virus had no more hosts. Each of us may practice rigorous social
distancing. But if our locales are not sealed off from each other, small leaks from one zone to
©CFAR 2020
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another means that that the virus still has a host size equal to the U.S. population. Social
distancing diminishes contact within a locale but it does not seal off one locale from another.
Perhaps this is why HS produced what it appears to me to be a pessimistic picture of the near
term. As I noted, it predicts that the virus will infect 99 million infected in six months or 82% of
its hosts. Since the growth is exponential, its growth will be slower in the first few months but
then will “take off,” a bit after the half-way mark. It is hard not to see this projection as a
prediction that social distancing will have failed as a containment strategy. It has simply come
too late.

II. Why social distancing will fail
All of us may stand six feet from one another, but realistically, we cannot shut the economy
down if we wish sustain a modicum of our current living conditions. Someone must deliver our
food and gas, repair our cars and trucks, pick items in the warehouses, deliver the mail, install
and repair our computing and networking equipment, construct hospitals facilities, produce
ventilators, and manage everyone’s beloved Zoom network. The promise that the federal
government will give people money is an empty one if there is nothing to buy. In fact, this
policy combined with a downturn will lead to inflation. We have no choice. Millions of people
must work. Unfortunately, these people will remain “vectors” for the virus, however rigorous
any of us is in our daily habits of hand-washing.
Consider some numbers. While much attention has been focused on people working from
home, roughly 75 million people, proverbially called blue collar workers, work outside the home.
Table 1: Blue Collar Occupations 2 (1000’s)

Out of home Occupations: Non-management occupations
Construction and extraction

8,325

Installation, maintenance, and repair

4,862

Production, transportation, and material moving

18,628

Transportation and material moving

10,063

Protective services

3,128

Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance

5,746

Farming, fishing, and forestry

1,156

Installation, maintenance, and repair

4,862

Production

8,565

Transportation and material moving
Total

10,063
75,398

This is 38% of the total adult population of the U.S. In addition, there are 64 million managerial
and professional workers.

2

https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18b.htm
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Now, imagine that 15% all production workers were idled, a great not calamitous recession and
for every 10 production workers let go, a corresponding 3 professionals/managers are let go. In
addition imagine that ½ of the employed professionals work from home.
Consider as well another issue. The people who are most frightened by the pandemic are the
old and infirm. Younger people are less frightened since they are much less likely to have
weakened immune systems. They will not be able to gather in large numbers in restaurants, but
they will continue to stay on the street, particularly as the weather improves, to shop in
supermarkets, to visit hospitals and doctor’s officers as needed, to ride buses and trains, to stay
at hotels, etc.
If “old” is over 65, then the “non-old” group is about ¾ of the workforce. In addition, they are
the ones who are more likely to be asymptomatic. Feeling healthy, they are less likely to be
cautious, particularly as the protocols for social distancing become wearing and the stress of
idleness, marital discord, the press of unsupervised children, and economic anxiety increases.
with others can we really expect this policy to be successful?
These assumption are represented in this table.
Table 2: What happens when workers are unemployed: Some assumptions

Pofessional workers in the workforce
Production workers in the work force
Unemployment rate of production workers
Unemployment rate of professional workers
% of workers less than 65 years
%o of employed professionals who work at home
% of people at home who don't practice social distance

64
75
0.15
0.045
0.75
0.5
0.5

We get the following results:
Table 2A. Production worker unemployment rate: 15%

Prof
Total in work place
At home
Don’t practice SD while at home
Potential vectors for the virus

29
35
13
42

Production
64
11
4
68

110

We get 110 million people who are vectors for the virus, a third of the work force. We might
suppose that we could reduce the number of “vectors” by drastically cutting back on jobs.
Consider an unemployment rate for production workers of 50%, a calamitous level more than
twice the rate of the Great Depression. We get the following:

©CFAR 2020
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Table 2B: Production workers unemployment rate of 50%

Total in work place
At home
Don’t practice SD while at home
Potential vectors for the virus

22
42
16
38

38
38
14
52

90

Even though the unemployment rate has increased more than three-fold, the number of people
who are potential vectors for the virus fall by only 18%. This is because we are just shifting
people from the workplace to the home and if younger people are not rigorous in practicing
social distance they can spread the infection whether at home or at work.
There is a more insidious consequence of social distancing, but it will be soon become
apparent. We are unraveling the supply chain. This is dangerous when, at the same time, we
anticipate mobilizing people, money, and resources to meet the challenge of building hospital
capacity. What happens when people responsible for sourcing supplies and skilled workers
come up short?

III. The health costs of economic distress
We also have to consider the impact of economic distress on health. The virus kills but so can
severe economic downturns. Two studies are relevant.3 The first, a classic in the field, and
based on a review of experiences in nine western countries, found that a 1% increase in
unemployment led to 6,000 extra deaths in the population in a particular year. Of course,
“frictional” unemployment, when workers move between jobs need not be distressing. What
counts is the length of the unemployment experience. The average duration of employment in
the U.S. from 1990 to the present is about 21 weeks or five months. Social distancing will most
likely induce a recession, and it could be severe because, as I have already noted, many
businesses, particular the smaller ones, will face a cash crunch and likely bankruptcy.
Recessions on average last 11 months, longer than the average bout of unemployment.
The following table shows the relationship between downturns and unemployment.
Table 4: Recessions and Unemployment4

1954
1974
1975
1991
2008
2009

Contraction Unemploym
in GDP
ent rate
-0.60%
5.0%
-0.50%
7.2%
-0.20%
8.2%
-0.10%
7.3%
-0.10%
7.3%
-2.50%
9.9%

3

R L Jin, C P Shah, and T J Svoboda The impact of unemployment on health: a review of the evidence,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1487417/
4
https://www.thebalance.com/unemployment-rate-by-year-3305506
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The rate of unemployment just before the coronavirus crisis was 3.6% If the recession is as
severe as that which followed the 2008 crash, a 9.9 % unemployment, the contraction should
produce excess mortality of 6000 x (9.9 - 6.3) = or 37,000 “extra” deaths, just within this year.
If the recession were more extreme, 15% employment and it lasted for at least a year, we
would “create” 6,000 x (15 - 3.6) or 68,400 deaths.
Social distancing may compound this empirical link between health and economic hard times. In
normal times, when despair is shared, people help each other thus mitigating their sense of
isolation. The shared despair paradoxically can create social cohesion. This experience protects
health just as unemployment undermines it. For example, in the Great Depression of the 1930s,
workers and farmers found agency and cohesion in their struggle to form unions and in their
common fates as they migrated West. Paradoxically, one result of social distancing is social
isolation and the fear and suspicion that other people are careless in their regard for one’s own
health, or worse, that they are predators.
These estimates are based on correlating yearly data. We must take account of the “long tail”
consequences of a major recession or depression. Some detailed clinical studies of particular
populations allow us to take account of this longer tail in terms of health outcomes. For
example, one meta-analysis reports5 on two studies of the “standard mortality rate” of
unemployed men in the U.K. The Standard Mortality Rate (SMR) is the ratio of the observed
death rate of subjects in a particular study relative to the death rate of similar group in the
population. So, a rate of 121 represents a 21% increase over the expected rate.
In one study of unemployed men, they suffered a 21% increase mortality relative to their peers
and in a second study, a 47% increase.
Table 5: Standard Mortality

Age group
15-64
15-64

Number of Standard
Men in
Mortality
Study
Rate
5861
121
14675
147

We can use these results to calculate the impact of long-term unemployment on the mortality
of U.S. workers. To do this, consider first the following table. It presents the expected deaths
per 100,000 men of different ages and the percent that each age group is of the total labor
force. I used this data to create a weighted average for workers aged 16 to 64 of 403 deaths
per 100,000 in a given year.

5

Op cit, RL Jin
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Table 6: Deaths per/100,0006

Age groups Deaths per % of labor
(men)
100,000
force
15-19
72.7
3%
20-24
137.9
10%
25-34
154.6
24%
35-44
232
23%
45-54
422
22%
55-64
1124
18%
Weighted
average
deaths

403

This number became my expected death for workers in the labor force and I could then apply
the SMRs to calculate the extra deaths.
Table 7: Extra Deaths due to Unemployment

Age group
15-64
15-64

Number of Standard
Extra
Men in
Morality
deaths per
Study
Rate
100,000
5861
121
85
14675
147
189
Average
137

So we can expect that there will be an extra 137 deaths per 100,000 people should the
economic contraction result in a significant recession. There are 78 million men in the labor
force from the ages of 16 to 64. If we have a contraction with 15% unemployment, then the
number of expected deaths would be .15 x (78 million/100,000) x 137 = 16,029 extra deaths
Note that this only applies to men. If women were ¾ as likely to die as men, we would have
extra deaths of 28,050 deaths
Of course, these are admittedly rough calculations, but I think they point to order of magnitude
estimates that warrant serious consideration. We are looking at somewhere between an extra
28,000 to 68,000 deaths should the current contraction and resulting recession prove severe.
We must consider the mortality risks of a severe recession. They are likely to be substantial and
they will be hidden, because they will have a longer tail than the deaths associated with the
virus.
Let’s step back. Here is my pessimistic scenario (as if there is not enough already). Without
draconian measures that lock down regions and cities, the social distancing strategy will fail in
about three to four months. Everyone will be on course to be infected. We will unravel the
6
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supply chain we need to build the beds required to treat the sick and fend off deaths. The
resulting economic depression and social distress will be demoralizing. People will have
sacrificed living conditions and social connections for nothing. They will experience inflation, the
first in the living memory of young adults.
Not enough beds, inflation, unemployment, a demoralized population and deaths the virus did
not cause. Five horses of the apocalypse. This is a dangerous outcome.

IV. Two extant strategies
The Chinese and the South Koreans provide us with two distinct strategies for responding to the
crisis; regional lock downs, and mass testing combined with the surveillance. There is a third,
which I envision as an American response: The reverse quarantine combined with a new
“Manhattan project,” the latter, a reference to the project established to build the atomic bomb
in World War II. I will make an argument for this third alternative. It draws on American can-do
culture and its volunteer ethos—if indeed we can draw on this reservoir of historical memory
and experience. My proposal may be too late in the coming months and perhaps is decidedly
utopian in character. But if I am to remain true to my sense of urgency and contribute to the
necessary discussion we must have, I feel I have no choice but to offer them.
Lock down
The Chinese have clearly been successful with a lock down strategy, increasing the doubling
time of deaths to 34 days, the days it takes for deaths to double, though there has been some
slippage since earlier in the week. At the time of this writing, their doubling time was 34, days
and if my notes are correct, it was once 39. The virus is down but it may not be out. By all
accounts, they have achieved their success through draconian measures that cannot be
reproduced elsewhere. As one reporter notes,7 “Thirteen cities, containing more than 60 million
people have been locked down. Homes have become prisons; life has stopped China has the
ability to impose these measures better than anyone else on the planet,” As another observer
noted, “There's no other place that could do what China did to that magnitude and sustain it.”8
As I noted, lockdowns succeed for one simple reason: they deprive the virus of the large host
population it needs to spread itself widely. But this means that there can be no leakage
between locales. Any leakage—a truck driver, a salesperson—creates a vector for carrying the
virus from one locale to another.
Mass testing and surveillance
The South Koreans have succeeded with mass testing and surveillance, driving up their
doubling days of deaths to 12, though this still represents roughly, a 6% growth rate per day.
As of March 17, they conducted a total of 274,000 tests and are able to test 20,000 per day.
They have 50 drive in centers for testing. Testing is matched with surveillance. The government
mandates that people install GPS tracking devices on their phones and, “Public government
reports detail the whereabouts of every single confirmed patient—down to which theater seat
7
8

https://www.wired.co.uk/article/coronavirus-uk-response-china
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/coronavirus-uk-response-china
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they sat in, which plastic surgery clinic they visited and even where they got their lingerie. The
health and the National Police Agency share the “location information of patients and of persons
likely to be infected.” 9 With this tracking system the authorities can rapidly “contact-trace”
hundreds of thousands of its own citizens to curb the outbreak. In addition, as a result of new
amendments to current laws and regulations, “The government can criminally prosecute
suspected patients who refuse to get tested for the virus with a fine of up to 3,000,000 KRW
(~$3,000). The amendment also significantly increases the potential penalty for breaking
quarantine to up to one year of imprisonment or a fine of 10,000,000 KRW (about $10,000) for
the offense.” 10
The South Korean experience highlights how testing and surveillance must be combined.
Testing people helps individuals make informed and thoughtful decisions if they choose to do
so, for example, to protect others. But without such native consideration, the impact of testing
on containing the virus is limited. It does not by itself prevent the infection’s spread. It is very
important for protecting healthcare workers who can screen the patients they care for, but it
won’t necessarily control the infection’s spread
I understand that these are tintype descriptions. Much more can and will be written on the
record of these countries’ responses and results. But I highlight them to suggest that there
should be a fit between a country’s cultural makeup and the measures it uses to combat the
virus. For example, the South Koreans in their effort, profit from several distinctive cultural
features: their cultural cohesion and homogeneity, their familiarity and comfort with putting
themselves on a quasi-war footing—a legacy of the existential threat from the North—the social
discipline that propelled the country from poverty to wealth in two generations, and from their
Confucian tradition that values loyalty.
It is also evident that the Chinese Communist Party’s uncontested policer power has helped
them fight the virus in their country. The party’s cell structure in government, and increasingly
in private companies—the shadow authority system that regulates and constrains apparent
authority in all institutions—helps the party direct and coordinate the decisions and choices of
local and regional governments and ministries.
The hospital capacity problem project
What option do we have in the U.S.? First, let’s consider the scale of the problem. The
presenting challenge, as every expert acknowledges, is that we do not have the hospital beds
and the associated staff and equipment to care for the people who will be acutely ill. What is
the size of the gap?
The HS projects a need for 1.3 million beds in the next six months to accommodate roughly 21
million patients. This means roughly that every bed can “turnover” 21/1.4 or roughly 15
patients in six months, or 2.5 patients per month. This means roughly a length of stay of .4
days of a month (1/2.5), or a bit less than two weeks.

9

https://www.lawfareblog.com/lessons-america-how-south-korean-authorities-used-law-fight-coronavirus
Ibid
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The CDC reports11 that seniors (those older than 65), will account for 45% of hospitalizations,
53% of ICU admissions, and 80% of deaths associated with the virus. In addition, the HS
projects that 21% of all admissions to the hospital will be to the ICU. We can use this data to
construct the following table.
Table 8: Admissions of 100 patients
seniors
ICU admits
Regular admits

not seniors
11
10
34
55

This table begins to give a sense of the resource load on the hospital system that seniors
constitute. They are 45% of all admits and 52% of all ICU admits.
I can use this data to “reverse engineer” the HS projection, that, on average, a patient will
spend a bit less than two weeks in the hospital. This number at first seems high but that is
because it reflects both ICU and regular admissions. Patients in the ICU will stay longer than
patients in acute care beds. The following table shows the results. (If the reader finds the
concept of “fractional patients” bothersome, just multiply the patient and patient-day numbers
by one-hundred, so that “.5” becomes “50” and “2” becomes “200.”)
Table 9: Patients and patient-days per month

Length of
Number of stay in
PatientPatients
months
days
ICU admits
0.5
1.00
0.5
Regular
2.0
0.25
0.5
Total patients

2.5

0.4

I calculated these numbers in the following way. We know from the HS that each bed turns
over 15 patients in six months or 2.5 patients per month. This is equivalent to the idea of
“inventory turns” in business, or the way a restaurant owner thinks of his tables- how many
dinner parties does it turn over in an evening. Using the data from Table 10 this means that of
these 2.5 patients, .5 are admitted to the ICU and the rest to regular beds. “Playing with the
numbers,” I found that if an ICU patient stays a month in the hospital and a regular patient
stays a week this means arithmetically that the length of stay of the “average” patient will
be .41 months, (.5+.5/2.5), which matches very closely, the HS data.
We just need a few more steps in the calculation. Using the percentages in Table 10 we find
that:

11

https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6912e2.htm?s_cid=mm6912e2_w
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Table 10: Old people admissions per month per bed

Total admits per bed per month
Senior/ICU
Senior/regular

2.5
0.28
0.84

So we can now use Tables 8 and 9 to “subtract” the old people from the 2.5 patients per month
load on a hospital bed. We can use the results to calculate the new average length of stay and
patient load per bed.
Table 11: Impact of withdrawing old people on patient days

Length of
Number of stay in
PatientPatients
months
days
ICU admits
0.2
1.00
0.2
Regular
1.1
0.25
0.3
Total patients
1.4
0.39
Patients have dropped from 2.5 patients per bed per month to 1.4 patients. If originally a bed
was turning over 2.5 patients and is now turning over 1.4 patients, we need correspondingly
1.4/2.5 = 56% as many beds. The reason this drop is so large, more than half, is because
seniors are slightly more than half of all admits and more than half of all ICU admits, the
admissions that take up more bed-time. Since the HS projection is for 1.3 million beds, the
number of beds saved comes to roughly (1-.56) x 1.3 million or 572,000 beds. This is a sizeable
reduction in bed requirements.
Quarantining has two other important benefits. It reduces the demand for ICU beds by almost
40%, --.2/.5. This has a great impact on the hospital workforce. It also reduces the number of
deaths. Let’s assume that deaths only occur when a patient in an ICU, does not survive. This
corresponds roughly to reality. By quarantining old people we prevent 2.5 -.2= 1.7 seniors from
entering the ICU and occupying a bed every month, or 10.2 patients per bed over the sixmonth projection of the HS. Since there are 1.3 million beds that old people would have
occupied, had they not been quarantined, we prevent 1.3 x 10.2 = 13.26 million seniors from
occupying ICU beds. Chinese data12 suggests that old people have a mortality rate that ranges
between 1.5% an 4.7%. If we presume that this range characterize seniors in the ICU, then the
number of deaths prevented is between 199,00 and 620,000 deaths. If we took the average of
the two, we get 409,000 lives saved, a very meaningful result.
We can also reduce the load on hospitals by somewhat reducing the average length of stay in
the non-ICU. I presume this would be easier to accomplish in acute care beds as opposed to
ICU beds. Let me first look at the numbers. As we have seen, working with the HS data and my
interpolations of it, by withdrawing seniors from the hospitals we reduce the patients occupying
a regular bed from 2.0 to 1.1. Let’s assume that we can reduce length of stay from roughly
seven days, ¼ of a month, to five days, or .167 of a month. We can use the following table to
calculate how many beds we would save.
12
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Table 12: The impact of reducing length of stay

patients

length of stay Patient days
1.1
0.25
0.275
1.65
0.167
0.275

If 1.1 patients stay for .25 days then the total patient=days a bed supports is .275. if we want a
bed to continue to be as “productive” and if the length of stay drops from seven days to five, a
bed can support 1.65 patients as against 1.1 patients. Correspondingly, we would need only
1.1/1.65 = 2/3 as many beds to support the same number of patients. If the total number of
beds reduced, after having protected seniors from hospitalization is 728,000 then we would
save an additional 243,000.
I have some general knowledge on how to reduce length of stay in non-critical care beds,
based not on any medical expertise, but on my management consulting experience. If that
experience is relevant to the treatment of this virus, it suggests that hospitals can reduce length
of stay by applying good practice using standardized protocols and permitting little variation.
Patient care under these circumstances must be “industrialized.” Whether this is possible under
the extremes of the urgent situation we currently face is a separate but important question.
Finally, as everyone now recognizes we can save on building new bed capacity by repurposing
current hospital beds. The Society for Critical Care Medicine reports that that in 2010 there
were 641,000 total acute care beds, which included 104,000 ICU beds. They note that the
number of ICU beds grew 17% from 2000 to 2010. Applying this same growth rate to the last
decade for both acute care and ICU beds we get an estimate of 750,00 beds. 13John Hopkins
Center for health security suggested that hospitals release 30% of its beds to treat patients
with the virus. Based on these estimate, this releases 225,000 beds. 14
We can now integrate the results of our different calculations. We can project the following bed
savings:
Table 13: Summarizing how to save on bed construction
Action
Withdrawing seniors
Reducing length of stay
Repurposing beds

Beds
572,000
242,667
225,000

New bed construction not required
1,039,667
HS estimates of beds required
1,300,000
New beds required
260,333
The challenge under this scenario looks far less scary and much more doable.

13
14
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enter_to_enhance_hospital_operations
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A virtual circle
There are two very important benefits of reducing the load on our bed supply. First, it frees up
management, planning, workforce, and material resources to produce the ventilators that are
so essential for good care. Second, and more subtly, the rationale for strict social distancing is
to pace the rate at which the infection spreads so that the hospital system is not overwhelmed.
Everyone susceptible to the infection will eventually get it. It is just a question of when. If we
are at much less risk of overwhelming our hospital system we can then relax the social
distancing regimen and tolerate a faster spread of the virus. We can move more quickly to
restore our economy and protect our supply chain, the very chain we need to respond to the
crisis in the first place. In effect, we could create a virtual circle, where:
u By protecting seniors, we reduce the load on the hospital system. As a result we can both

release resources to produce ventilators and to build the extra beds we need more readily.

u As we do this, we relax social distance measures, which restores the supply chain and

enables us to build the hospital infrastructure we need. This also reduces the risk of
business bankruptcy, decreasing the likelihood of a significant recession with its health
knock-on effects in terms of more deaths later.
u As the infection spreads more rapidly, the virus “burns itself out” more quickly, at least for

this season, and we develop population immunity more quickly. We can accommodate
people who get sick earlier with our more prepared hospital system with the requisite
number of ventilators and beds. These people will be younger. They are less at risk and will
require fewer ICU beds and resources.
u Most importantly we prevent a significant number of deaths of seniors.

The following visual describes the virtuous circle
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An alternate reality?
One presenting issue is whether or not it is feasible and ethical to quarantine seniors. Some
seniors could adapt. For example, they can work from home, are retired, and enough money in
the bank and can rely on the love and attention of children, grandchildren and close relatives.
Many of these seniors appear to be self-isolating voluntarily. On the other hand, there are
seniors who can’t readily adapt. They have less money, care for young grandchildren, or live
alone. The latter number 11 million! 15 Enforced isolation is not far from imprisonment even if it
is “for your own good!,”
One imaginary response—call it my “alternate reality”—is that the federal government in
coordination with local governments, charitable and service organizations (such as the Red
Cross and Meals on Wheels, public libraries, along with block and neighborhood associations)
could—with the right level of coordination, paid staff, and federal and state money—bring
resources, help, and succor to seniors who need it. This will reduce the seniors’ sense of
isolation and enhance their psychological sense of community. Perhaps one way to proceed is
to mobilize social services for the isolated first, while at the same time providing inducements
and supports to all other seniors, for example subsidizing home food delivery, waived feeds for
cable channels, and other such practical measures.
The counterpoint to this argument, or fantasy if you are a skeptic, is two-fold. It is simply too
late. But this is the peril lurking in the background of the very effort that led me to write this
working paper. We may have no time left. Our planning has been fitful. We did not respond to
the early signs of the pandemic in China. President Trump seems reluctant to put us on a true
war footing through which the federal government could commandeer the resources we need
to prepare quickly. All these inconvenient truths together may be shouting from the hilltop,
“Game over!”
The second argument by one dear friend, is that this society is too socially and psychologically
damaged to imagine that any campaign for protecting strangers, or perhaps even one’s
relatives is plausible. We simply lack cohesion. Polarization has fatally undermined our good
will. Another dear friend adds, that while many people respond with vivacity and commitment
to helping people in natural disasters, the pandemic lacks the visceral qualities of a flood,
firestorm, or a 9/11 to provoke people to actions. The bias is to self-protect, a bias
paradoxically reinforced by social distancing—or, alternatively, to throw caution to the wind,
one response to our failure to respond

V. A Manhattan Project
Earlier in this working paper I referenced the “Manhattan Project.” This was the effort that FDR
instigated at Einstein’s prodding to marshal the greatest American engineering and scientific
talent to build an atomic bomb before the Nazis did. But I am no Roosevelt, Einstein, or Robert
Oppenheimer who ably ran the project from its inception to its completion. So let me begin on a
personal note.
As a child I watched a popular television show called Queen for a Day. It was a 1950s show. A
few ordinary women would tell a sad story of their life, and the live audience would vote on
15
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whose sad tale was most meritorious. That woman was “Queen for a Day.” She received help
for her problem—for example, money for her child's surgery, and some gifts that were only
tangentially related to her tale. I don't know why I was drawn to the show. Perhaps it was my
mother, a Holocaust survivor had her own very sad tale, and a trauma which haunted her and
which she could never expunge. Perhaps in responding to the current crisis the trauma of this
earlier one which I have internalized, provokes the question, “Why did we not see what was
coming?”
So, if I were “Queen for a Day” I would do the following:
u Put the country on a war-footing. Create a war-production board to organize the widest

features of the required response to the crisis.

u Announce a quarantine of all seniors.
u Create a command center for organizing federal, state, and local agencies, not-for-profits,

and companies to build a system for supporting the seniors in their home. The ethos of the
command center would be a military campaign with clear objectives, command power to cut
through red tape and an open-ended funding stream. The primary method for ensuring that
seniors comply should be through inducement and shaming.

u Use a similar command structure to begin building the hospital supply, the beds, and

ventilators that are required. Create a building target based on estimates that consider the
kinds of calculations I develop in this working paper. If necessary, commandeer private
businesses to meet these targets.
u Build a system for developing and enforcing a standardized protocol for reducing and

sustaining a requisite and minimum length of stay in non-ICU beds.

u Protect the supply chain required to produce the infrastructure we need to help us care for

the sick. Risk putting people in the field to make this happen.
u Prepare a plan for price controls, as is done in war, should supply shortages emerge.
u Plan forward for relaxing social distancing measures depending on the rate of spread of

infections, best measured by the doubling days of deaths. The sooner we confirm its wide
spread, declare an end to the practice and restart the economy.
u Develop a plan for preventing the bankruptcy of small businesses. Rather than focus on

loans, which only adds to future business expense, give small businesses contracts that
commit all levels of government to buy these businesses’ products and services over the
next year. Businesses can use these contracts to secure lines of credit with their banks.
u For all initiatives focus at all the times on the bottlenecks. Don’t try to get everything right,

just release the bottlenecks.

This thrust of this proto-plan is partly a response to the constricted quality of the discourse to
date about how to cope with the crisis. The epidemiologists have dominated the discussion to
our great cost and injury. The public health perspective is essential, but we desperately need
system thinkers, project managers, enterprise builders, corporate CEOs, economists, and
engineers. The time for calibrating one more model is long past. As a systems-psychodynamic
theorist, I am interested in understanding how it came to pass that a war against a plague
became a public health story alone. One hypothesis is that the public health professionals have
filled the vacuum because the command center—the President—has been too passive, reactive,
and without the capacity to inspire and direct. But that is a conversation for another day.
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My dearest reader: I have no influence in this world, beyond my limited personal and
professional sphere. I wrote this working paper with a degree of urgency, as a way enacting the
limited agency I have, which is my capacity to think, and put out good ideas into the ether. I
also wrote this working paper as one way of coping with my own anxiety by imagining,
fantasizing, that I could have some effect on the looming crisis. But if you feel similarly urgent
and some or any of the ideas here resonate, I urge you to find your best way of “shouting it
from the hilltop.” We need many more voices from many different disciplines to respond to the
current crisis.
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